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From Market Driven to
Market Driving
NIRMALYA KUMAR, IMD, Lausanne
LISA SCHEER, University of Missouri, Columbia
PHILIP KOTLER, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University
Firms are constantly exhorted to become more mar-
ket driven. However, our study of 25 pioneering
companies (e.g. Body Shop, IKEA, Tetra Pak) whose
success has been based on radical business inno-
vation indicates that such companies are better
described as market driving. While market driven
processes are excellent in generating incremental
innovation, they rarely produce the type of radical
innovation which underlies market driving compa-
nies. Market driving companies, who are generally
new entrants into an industry, gain a more sus-
tainable competitive advantage by delivering a leap
in customer value through a unique business sys-
tem. Market driving strategies entail high risk, but
also offer a firm the potential to revolutionize an
industry and reap vast rewards. Although estab-
lished companies face four major obstacles in
developing and launching radical market driving
business ideas, we offer several recommendations
to help established companies overcome these
obstacles and become more market driving.  2000
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
The value of being market driven is unquestioned in
companies today. Current practice dictates that suc-
cess starts with careful market research, investigating
the customers’ needs, and developing differentiated
products or services for a well-defined segment. Vari-
ous excellent companies such as Nestle´, Procter &
Gamble, and Unilever effectively employ this market
driven approach. However, many successful pion-
eering companies, who have created new markets
and revolutionized existing industries through radical
business innovation like Amazon.com, Body Shop,
CNN, IKEA, Starbucks, and Swatch, are better
described as market driving. Although market driving
involves inherently high risk and many would-be
market drivers fail spectacularly, when market driv-
ing strategies are successfully devised and
implemented they rewrite industry rules and offer
the potential to reap vast rewards. By studying the
elements that contribute to the success of these mar-
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ket drivers, we can glean insights about the culti-
vation of successful market driving innovations.
Consider Aravind Eye Hospital of Southern India.1
In 1976, a 58 year old retired eye surgeon, Dr. Venkat-
aswamy, devised a plan to serve the 15 million resi-
dents of India who were blind as a result of cataracts.
Venkataswamy’s vision was to market cataract sur-
gery, a relatively straightforward operation, like
McDonald’s hamburgers. Hospitals in India typically
fell into one of two categories — private hospitals
that served the small, wealthy segment of the popu-
lation with state-of-the-art facilities or charitable hos-
pitals that served the poor, vast majority of the popu-
lation with inadequate, out-dated, overcrowded
facilities. In addition, most of the poor, who reside
in the countryside, were unable to access most hospi-
tals, which were usually located in urban areas.
To implement his vision of giving eyesight to the
blind, regardless of ability to pay, Dr Venkataswamy
set up hospitals in South India that serve both the
rich, who pay for the state-of-the-art cataract surgery,
and the poor, who receive almost identical services
for free. The salesforce, advertising, and promotion
of Aravind Eye Hospital focus on attracting free
rather than paying patients. For example, the sales
force has annual targets for the number of free
patients they must generate; weekly ‘sales meetings’
monitor individual performance towards these tar-
gets. Aravind’s sophisticated salespeople scour the
Indian countryside looking for poor patients within
their assigned territories and then transport them to
the hospital at no cost to the patient. Think what cus-
tomer satisfaction must be like among these poor
patients who regain their ability to see — for free!
By focusing on eyecare and routinizing procedures,
Aravind’s surgeons are so productive that this non-
profit organization has a gross margin of 50 per cent
despite the fact that over 65 per cent of the patients
served do not pay! And unlike most nonprofit
organizations in the developing world, it is not
Published in European Management Journal, Volume 18, Issue 2, April 2000, Pages 129-142.
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-2373(99)00084-5
FROM MARKET DRIVEN TO MARKET DRIVING
dependent on donations and attempts to maximize
the number of free patients served.
What Aravind Eye Hospital shares with other market
driving firms such as Amazon.com, Benetton, Body
Shop, Charles Schwab, Club Med, CNN, Dell, FedEx,
Hennes and Mauritz, IKEA, SAP, Sony, Southwest
Airlines, Starbucks, Swatch, Tetra Pak, Virgin, and
Wal-Mart is the inability of the market driven
approach to explain their success. These market driv-
ing firms did not use traditional market research to
devise their path-breaking strategies that challenge
the status quo. Market research, while useful in gener-
ating incremental innovation, seldom leads to break-
through innovations.2 The inspiration for the radical
business ideas of these market driving firms came
from a visionary such as Dr Venkataswamy, Anita
Roddick of Body Shop, or Richard Branson of Virgin
who saw the world differently and whose vision
addressed some deep-seated, latent, or emerging
need of the customer. Rather than focusing on
obtaining market share in existing markets, these
market drivers created new markets (e.g. CNN, Fed-
eral Express, SAP, Tetra Pak) or redefined the cate-
gory in such a fundamental way that competitors
were rendered obsolete (e.g. none of the top 10 dis-
counters of 1962, the year Wal-Mart was born, are in
business today).3 Ultimately, these firm revol-
utionized their industries by changing the rules of the
game and ‘driving’ their markets.
Our research indicates that the success of market
driving firms is based in radical innovation on two
dimensions — a discontinuous leap in the value
proposition and the implementation of a unique busi-
ness system (see Figure 1).4 Value proposition refers
to the combination of benefits, acquisition efforts/costs,
and price offered to customers. For example, IKEA
offers the benefits of clean Scandinavian design and
image, tremendous assortment, immediate delivery,
Figure 1 Types of Strategic Innovation
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a pleasant shopping atmosphere, and low prices,
while asking the consumer in return to engage in self-
service, self-assembly, and self-transportation, often
from peripheral locations. This was a dramatically
different value proposition from the traditional, full
service, expensive, high street furniture store. As Fig-
ure 2 indicates, rather than playing on the existing
industry iso-value line, market driving firms such as
IKEA deliver a discontinuous leap in customer value.
The leap in customer value provided by market driv-
ing firms may involve either breakthrough tech-
nology or breakthrough marketing. The success of
Body Shop, FedEx, Starbucks, and even CNN and
Wal-Mart is less about new technology than about
aggressively exploiting existing technology to see the
marketplace differently and to serve the customer in
an unconventional manner. The key to the success
of these market driving firms is that they create and
deliver a leap in benefits, while reducing the sacri-
fices and compromises that customers make to
receive those benefits (e.g. having to organize your
schedule around when the networks wish to broad-
cast the news) (Stalk et al., 1996). They create a
product/service experience that overwhelms cus-
tomer expectations and existing alternatives. As a
result, the landscape of the industry is substantially
altered.
Business system refers to the configuration of the
various activities required to create, produce, and
deliver the value proposition to the customer. IKEA
could not deliver its discontinuous value proposition
by just improving on the existing business system of
the traditional furniture store (see Figure 3).5
Traditional furniture channels were beset by expens-
ive independent designers, high work-in-progress
inventory, labor intensive handicraft manufacturing,
Figure 2 Leap in Customer Value
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Figure 3 Unique Business System
considerable transportation and inventory of finished
goods, fragmented marketing, costly high street retail
locations, elaborate displays, and expensive delivery
to the consumer. To deliver the discontinuous leap
in customer value, IKEA had to radically reconfigure
the industry business system. IKEA’s unique busi-
ness system uses cost-conscious in-house design,
interchangeable parts, high volume component
manufacturing, parts inventory (rather than more
expensive finished product inventory), extensive
computerization of logistics, its natural Scandinavian
image, relatively inexpensive peripheral locations,
and simple display facilities, leaving final transpor-
tation and assembly to the consumer. To profitably
copy IKEA’s value proposition, firms in the tra-
ditional furniture channel would need to dismantle
the existing business system while migrating to a
new IKEA type business system — a Herculean
task indeed!
Because the value proposition is visible in the mar-
ketplace while the business system is harder to dis-
cern, competitors often miss the importance of the
latter. For example, Dell delivers built-to-order cus-
tomized PCs which incorporate the latest technologi-
cal advances faster than its competitors and at
reasonable prices. To deliver this value proposition,
Dell invented a radically different business system
combining minimal R&D expenditures, made-to-
order flexible manufacturing systems (which give
them a slight manufacturing cost disadvantage), one
week of inventory consisting mostly of parts, mini-
mal end-user advertising, and efficient direct distri-
bution channels. In contrast, Dell’s primary competi-
tors, Compaq and IBM, have high R&D expenditures,
large run low variety (but low cost) manufacturing
systems, one month of mostly finished goods inven-
tory, extensive end-user advertising, and expensive
third-party distribution channels. When Compaq and
IBM tried to copy Dell’s value proposition by setting
up their own direct channels, their existing business
systems proved too ‘sticky’ to do so profitably. It is
difficult to deliver customized products at competi-
tive prices with high volume, low variety manufac-
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turing systems and unhappy, bypassed channel
members. In the absence of a unique business system,
any advantage gained from a discontinuous leap in
the value proposition can be copied fairly quickly by
existing players. Therefore, market driving firms who
change the rules of the game are those that innovate
on both dimensions of Figure 1. The unique business
system creates a more sustainable advantage, as it
takes time for a would-be competitor to assemble the
intraorganizational and interorganizational players
needed to replicate that unique system architecture.
We describe these firms as market driving for three
reasons. First, market driving companies trigger
industry breakpoints or what Andy Grove of Intel
calls ‘strategic inflexion points’ which change the fun-
damentals of the industry through radical business
innovation. Second, instead of being inspired by tra-
ditional market research as conventional wisdom rec-
ommends, the inspiration for their radical business
concept usually comes from a visionary. Third, rather
than learn from existing customers, they often have
to teach potential customers to consume their discon-
tinuous value proposition.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we contrast
market driving with three other possible orientations
that a firm can have towards the marketplace. We
describe how market driving firms compete and seize
advantage. Then, we discuss why most market driv-
ing companies are new entrants to an industry and
explore the barriers and risks that large, established
firms face in successfully developing and launching
radical market driving innovations. Finally, we con-
clude with some recommendations for how estab-
lished companies can become more market driving.
How Market Driving Firms Seize
Advantage
Market driving can be distinguished from three other
orientations that a company can have towards the
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marketplace: sales driven, market driven, and cus-
tomer driven. These four categories represent ideal
types; no large organization adopts a single orien-
tation throughout all of its business units. A sales
driven orientation characterizes those firms who
view marketing as a tool to sell whatever their fac-
tory produces. Marketing and selling are inter-
changeable in such companies.6 Public utilities, mon-
opolies and some large manufacturing firms often
display a sales orientation. Market driven companies
instead place the customers at the start of the process
and through careful market research build appropri-
ate products for, and develop the desired image for,
their target segments. Most successful consumer
packaged goods companies such as L’Oreal fall in
this category. Customer driven companies, on the
other hand, target ‘segments of one’ and deliver cus-
tomized value configurations to each customer. This
is sometimes referred to as relationship marketing.
The Swiss private banking industry, which serves
high net worth individuals, is populated with several
such customer driven firms. Table 1 outlines and
summarizes the key distinctions between these four
marketplace orientations on various elements of mar-
keting strategy.
Given the focus of this paper, we concentrate on how
the market driving firm competes. Our in-depth
study of 25 market driving firms indicates that they
share certain common features as described below.
Guided by Vision Rather Than Traditional
Market Research
Consumers and organization buyers are excellent at
motivating and evaluating incremental innovation.
However, customers are usually unable to concep-
tualize or readily visualize the benefits of revolution-
Table 1 Four Orientations to Marketplace
Sales driven Market driven Customer driven Market driving
Marketing strategy Mass marketing (how to Differentiated marketing Relationship marketing Revolutionary marketing
sell?) (what image to build?) (who to serve?) (how to change the rules
of the game?)
Segmentation strategy Undifferentiated Market segments Segments of one Destroy industry
segmentation
Market research
‘Focus’ Market testing (how to Market sensing (what Customer sensing (what Forward sensing (how
sell it?) does the market want?) does this customer can the marketplace
want?) evolve)
‘Listen to’ R&D Voice of the market Voice of the customer Seeing differently
Price management Cost plus Perceived value Bundling/unbundling New price points
Sales management Sell products Sell image Sell solutions Customer education
Channel management Maximum coverage Product/market fit Multiplex systems Channel reconfiguration
Brand management Product superiority Broadcast for brand Dialogue for corporate Exploit ‘buzz network’
equity equity
Customer service Expense Tactical weapon Strategic weapon Overwhelm expectations
Product development New products Incremental innovation Integrating Radical innovation
product/service platforms
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ary products, concepts, and technologies. Consider
the experience of Swatch. The Swatch models that
received the highest intention to purchase in con-
sumer research were those that looked the most like
traditional watches. Those watches, however, ulti-
mately generated very few sales. Instead, the more
radically different Swatch models, which were rated
in traditional prelaunch consumer research as the
least likely to be bought, were subsequently the best
selling ones. Had Swatch been guided by that market
research, it would not have been a runaway success.
Similarly, customers weren’t clamoring for Starbucks
coffee, CNN, or overnight small package delivery
prior to their introduction.
Market driving firms instead coalesce around vision-
aries who saw opportunity where others did not —
an opportunity to fill latent, unmet needs or to offer
an unprecedented level of customer value. In our
research we discovered that generation and develop-
ment of ‘the idea’ was a combination of serendipity,
inexperience, and persistence. For example, Star-
bucks was founded in 1983 after Howard Schultz,
charmed by the Italian coffee culture of Verona and
Milan, promised to bring it to America. Frequently,
visionaries’ relative inexperience with the industry
meant they had not yet been inoculated with that
industry’s received wisdom. Nike’s Bowerman was
a college track coach, Club Med’s Gerard Blitz was a
diamond cutter, and Ingvar Kamprad, the founder of
IKEA, began his entrepreneurial career selling fish.
Often, these visionaries persisted in the face of many
failures and rejections to realize the dream such as
Fred Smith of FedEx who developed the guaranteed
overnight delivery idea in a business school term
paper as a junior at Yale. He received a ‘C’ for the
paper because the instructor was not convinced
about its practicality!7 Some spent years muddling
through refining their vision until everything clicked
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and they perfected their strategies. Wal-Mart’s initial
attempts were underwhelming. David Glass, today
the CEO of Wal-Mart was at that time employed with
a competing store; he reportedly opined after check-
ing out the first Discount City, ‘Those guys will never
make it.’ Sam Walton continued to tinker with the
formula until he got it right. Few of these visionaries
expected that their business idea would achieve the
level of success that was ultimately attained. As
Hasso Plattner, the co-founder of SAP, observed:
‘When people ask how we planned all this, we
answer “we didn’t. It just happened”’(Plattner, 1996).
Even when industries are revolutionized, the market
driver may not be profitable or successful in the long
term. For example, Amazon.com has dramatically
altered the landscape in the marketing of books, forc-
ing industry leaders like Barnes and Noble to venture
into e-tailing, even though Amazon has yet to come
near an operating profit.
Because they are trying to change the rules of the
game and face many obstacles on the way to success,
market driving companies recruit and select people
who subscribe to the values of the organization.
There is often an attempt to attract those with little
experience in the industry, individuals who have not
been infused with the industry’s conventional wis-
dom about why the market driving idea is doomed to
fail. Such employees are motivated strongly by their
belief that they are on a mission, not simply by
money, allowing them to tap into deeper motiv-
ational energies. A compelling vision enthusiastically
articulated by a charismatic leader turns these
employees into crusaders:
v Sam Walton believed that Wal-Mart stores would
‘lower the cost of living for everyone, not just
America... we’ll give the world an opportunity to
see what it’s like to save and have a better lifestyle,
a better life for all’ energized his employees.
v Ninety per cent of Body Shop franchisees are
women who have no formal business training but
are instead chosen on the basis of personality tests,
home visits, and attitudes towards the environ-
ment and people. They are motivated by founder
Anita Roddick’s idea that they can make a differ-
ence in people’s lives and in the world through
Body Shop.
v In the early days at FedEx, there were couriers
who pawned their watches to pay for gasoline.
Such historic, sometimes mythic, stories become part
of the organizational culture of most market driv-
ing firms.
Re-draw Industry Segmentation
By attracting their customers from a variety of pre-
viously-defined market segments, a new market
coalesces around the market driving firm’s product-
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service offering and marketing strategy. This creates
havoc in the industry by destroying the segmentation
followed by the industry prior to the market driver’s
entry and replacing it with a new set of segments
reflecting the new, altered landscape:
v Aravind Eye Hospital did not accept the normal
segmentation between rich and poor patients.
v Southwest Airlines destroyed the segmentation
between ground transportation and airlines,
attracting many who would not otherwise have
flown at all.
v Swatch, with its cheap and fashionable watches,
bridged the chasm between the segments for
cheap, utilitarian watches and expensive, fashion-
able ones.
v Wal-Mart demonstrated that small rural towns
could support huge discount stores which pre-
viously had located only in large urban areas.
v While existing software vendors concentrated on
developing different software packages for differ-
ent departments (e.g. manufacturing, sales,
human resources), SAP destroyed these distinc-
tions by developing enterprise software that could
integrate and run the entire business.
Value Creation Through New Price Points
To deliver a leap in customer value, market driving
firms establish new industry price points for the qual-
ity or service levels they deliver. Swatch, Aravind
Eye Hospital, Southwest Airlines, and Charles
Schwab all set prices much lower than those pre-
viously available for similar products. This puts exist-
ing competitors under tremendous pressure. The
competitors must make dramatic changes in oper-
ations and product lines to survive, but they are
unable to swiftly meet the challenge because they
cannot quickly and successfully reproduce the innov-
ative business system that enables the lower price
point. Continental learned this the hard way when
it tried to compete against Southwest Airlines with
‘Continental Lite’:
v When Southwest Airlines enters a new city they
price against ground transportation as much as
against existing air service. This typically results
in prices at least 60 per cent below competitive
airfares — sometimes over 75 per cent lower. For
example, Southwest Airlines charged $15.00 for a
trip from Dallas to San Antonio when Braniff, the
next most inexpensive competitor, was charging
$62.00. A shareholder asked the CEO, ‘Could you
not raise the price two or three dollars?’ and
received the response, ‘We are not competing
against other airlines but ground transportation.’
v Swatch adopted a simple introductory pricing
strategy — $40 in United States, 50 CHF in Switz-
erland, 60 DM in Germany, and 7000 yen in
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Japan — and kept those prices unchanged for the
first 10 years despite high demand.
While the trend is towards higher performance at
lower price points, there are market driving firms
who have established elevated price points that are
higher than typical in an industry. CNN, Starbucks,
and FedEx set prices considerably above what cus-
tomers had been paying. Inducing the buyer to pay
these higher prices requires that these market driving
firms have a value proposition that is significantly
more compelling than the available alternatives.
Sales Growth Through Customer Education
Given the radical new concept, the sales task for mar-
ket driving firms is not to sell but rather to educate
the customer on the existence of, and how to con-
sume, their radical value proposition:
v Aravind Eye Hospital has to continuously educate
its ‘free’ patients, who are predominantly illiterate,
that their vision can in fact be restored and that
the necessary surgery is available to them free of
charge.
v IKEA had to teach consumers the benefits of trans-
porting furniture components home for self-
assembly instead of buying it pre-assembled and
delivered. When IKEA entered Switzerland, they
ran advertisements which joked about the Swiss
unwillingness to transport and assemble furniture,
even for lower prices. The advertisements poked
fun at the self-delivery and self-assembly aspects
saying ‘That is a stupid thing’ and ‘You can’t do
that to the Swiss.’
Channel Reconfiguration
In almost every market driving firm, channel recon-
figuration appears to play a critical role in generating
the architectural innovation that results in a unique
business system. Market driving firms have unle-
ashed a wide range of innovative distribution and
channel management practices within their indus-
tries:
v FedEx transported packages using its own planes
via a ‘hub and spokes’ air freight system rather
than the ‘point-to-point’ commercial flights used
by competitors such as Emery. The result was that
FedEx was twice as likely as Emery to deliver a
package on time.
v On the other hand, Southwest Airlines does not
employ the hub and spoke system used by the rest
of the passenger airline industry, but rather con-
centrates on point-to-point short haul flights.
Southwest flies into major cities’ less congested
smaller airports which improves their on-time per-
formance vis-a`-vis major carriers. They used only
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Boeing 737s, reducing the costs of maintenance
and pilot training. Furthermore, Southwest Air-
lines does all of its own ticketing and does not
make seats available through the standard indus-
try computerized reservation systems like Sabre
and Apollo. As a result, only 55 per cent of
Southwest’s tickets are sold through travel agents
compared to 90 per cent for the industry, adding
up to substantial savings on travel agents’ com-
missions.
v Benneton has set up a unique system where they
subcontract simple, non-essential tasks. Only cru-
cial quality-maintenance tasks such as dyeing are
done in-house. Furthermore, by knitting products
prior to dyeing rather than vice versa they can
respond faster to sales data than the rest of the
industry.
v Wal-Mart revolutionized manufacturer–retailer
relationships by ‘forcing’ Procter & Gamble as
well as its other suppliers to rationalize their pro-
duct lines, adopt Everyday Low Prices, eliminate
wholesalers, present one invoice per company,
and establish electronic links with their stores
(Kumar, 1996). This helped eliminate considerable
costs in the value chain.
Brand Attachment by Capitalizing on the ‘Buzz
Network’
Market driving firms often place greater reliance on
the ‘buzz network’ to get their message across.
Because these firms offer a leap in customer value,
their customers are delighted and eager to notify
others about their ‘find.’ Reporters in trade publi-
cations and the popular press also often publicize the
radical new innovation. The commitment and
enthusiasm of early adopters and opinion leaders
generates excitement and an intangible brand cachet
that the market driving firm strives to maintain.
Consequently, market drivers don’t find it as neces-
sary to spend a lot of money on traditional advertis-
ing; their advertising-to-sales ratio is often less than
that of their established competitors:
v Benetton is a classic example of a market driving
firm leveraging its controversial advertising to
generate loads of free publicity and develop an
image which arouses strong feelings among both
those who love and those who hate them.
v Southwest Airlines boasts ‘We have a lot of
ambassadors out there, our Customers.’ Every
year representatives from dozens of cities beg
Southwest to launch services in their cities.
v A 1958 13-page Life magazine photo spread on
Club Med led to many more customers than
capacity. In 1962, 12 years after the first village,
they turned away more than a 100,000 applicants
as they could only accommodate 70,000 members.
v Nike didn’t run a single national television ad
until they had 1 billion dollars in sales. Phil Knight
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observes they instead ‘used word-of-foot advertis-
ing’ by getting the best athletes to wear their pro-
ducts.
v Virgin’s Richard Branson generates constant free
press through his hot air balloon expeditions,
highly public media wars against the established
players (such as having all planes painted with a
banner against the proposed BA–AA merger) and
even making public appearances in ‘drag.’
Overwhelm Customer Expectations
Market driving firms exceed existing customer expec-
tations which are typically formed through past
interactions with competitors or existing alternatives.
Part of the leap in customer value comes from
delivering service at levels far above what consumers
expect for the market driver’s price:
v The poor patients of Aravind Eye Hospital never
expected to regain their sight, as under normal cir-
cumstances an operation would be out of their
geographical, economic, and psychological reach.
v Because other discounters lower customers’ expec-
tations by providing such poor service, Wal-Mart
is perceived as providing great value despite its
rather limited service. In Houston, an umbrella-
wielding service rep walks customers to their cars
when it is raining at both Wal-Mart’s discount
store and Sam’s Club. This level of service is by a
warehouse club that operates on slim 10 per cent
gross margins! No wonder a typical Wal-Mart cus-
tomer visits Wal-Mart 32 times a year compared
to a loyal Kmart customer who shops only 15
times per year at Kmart.
v FedEx constantly led its customers to ever higher
expectations for quick delivery times, leaving
competitors struggling to meet the spiraling
demands.
v Twelve times between 1987 and 1993, low-priced
Southwest won the unofficial ‘triple crown’ of the
airline industry — fewest customer complaints,
fewest delays, and fewest mishandled bags — a
feat no other carrier had ever achieved. CEO Herb
Kelleher observed that ‘it’s easy to offer great ser-
vice at a high cost. It’s easy to offer lousy service
at low cost. What’s tough is offering great service
at low cost, and that is what our goal is’8
Obstacles to Market Driving in
Established Firms
Most innovations in any industry are launched by the
large, established incumbent firms within that indus-
try, but these are predominantly incremental inno-
vations rather than radical innovations. Since the suc-
cess of market driving firms is based on radical
innovation and turning existing industry rules on
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their head, market driving companies are usually
new entrants to the industry.9 Often, the market driv-
ing ideas were available to, but rejected by, incum-
bents:
v Sam Walton, originally a Ben Franklin franchisee,
had his idea for starting big stores in small towns
turned down by the Ben Franklin franchise.
v Many major shoe manufacturers rejected the run-
ning shoe concept, which later was implemented
by Nike.
v SAP was formed by ex-IBM employees after IBM
Germany refused their request to develop
enterprise software for ICI.
Why do successful incumbents find it so difficult to
achieve the combination of radical innovation in both
value proposition and business system? Primarily
because four features of market driving ideas make
their management problematic for firms with well-
established new business development processes in
place.
First, market driving ideas are maverick in nature.
There is a degree of serendipity in the process. It is
often not possible to predict where in the organiza-
tion such an idea will arise or who will generate such
an idea. However, since most companies are
organized for efficiency, surprises are seen as nega-
tive events.10 Furthermore, individuals often feel
pressure to hide market driving ideas as they rebel
against the prevailing industry and incumbent wis-
dom. The vast industry experience of established
firms therefore becomes a barrier to being market
driving. It is difficult to unlearn received wisdom
that has become irrelevant as the fundamentals of the
industry shift (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). An
obsession with history — or even the present — can
prevent a firm from grasping and shaping the future.
Current market leaders often tend to discard maver-
ick ideas from inside or from outside the company
that don’t fit the prevailing industry wisdom. Bor-
ders, for example, has been slow to respond to the
threat of ‘E-tailing’ booksellers like Amazon.com:
v Linotype-Hell, a German company, invented Lino-
type printing presses in 1886. The ‘hot-type’ Lino-
type system was widely used for printing books,
magazines, and newspapers until the 1970s.
Although the company had dominated every
advance in publishing technology until that time,
they were blind-sided by the digital age of
software- and scanner-based printing. Linotype
managers clung to the ‘hot-type’ mind set that
came of age when typesetting involved loud clat-
tering mechanical machines rather than lasers. The
company’s stock had declined to a low of 56 DM
in July 1996 from a record high of 970 DM in May
1990 and was ultimately acquired in 1997 by Heid-
elberger Druckmaschinen, AG.
Second, market driving ideas involve high risk. For
None of the top 10
discounters of 1962, the year
Walmart was born, are in
business today
FROM MARKET DRIVEN TO MARKET DRIVING
every successful radical innovation in value prop-
osition and business system, there are probably hun-
dreds of failures that one never hears about. An
entrepreneur chasing a market driving dream has
bounded downside financial risk as he or she gener-
ally invests enormous effort but only limited capital.
However, if the idea is successful, there is unlimited
upside potential since a vast personal fortune can be
made. In contrast, in most organizations, the origin-
ator of a successful market driving idea may, at best,
receive a nice bonus or promotion (limited upside
potential), but a public failure may be the end of
one’s career within the organization or even beyond
(substantial downside potential). When one com-
bines the high failure rate of radical innovation with
the risk/reward ratio in most large organizations,
pursuing market driving ideas is not a rational strat-
egy for individuals in such organizations.
Third, the new business development process in most
firms tends to be biased against, and therefore
squelches, the more innovative breakthrough ideas
that could potentially create new markets. In most
market-leading firms, the new product development
and new business development processes favor pro-
jects that are triable, reversible, divisible, tangible,
familiar, serve current cus-
tomers, fit with the organiza-
tion’s direction, and are consist-
ent with sunk costs invested in
R&D, corporate image manage-
ment, sales training, and chan-
nels — all of which are rarely
characteristic of radically
innovative market offerings.
Established firms select new
business development opportunities on the basis of
technological feasibility and potential market size.
However, in the early stages of radical new business
development, it is difficult to know which technology
will succeed, with what capabilities, for which mar-
kets. The technological and operational problems
seem insurmountable, often with no obvious market
in sight. Expected applications dissolve and unfor-
seen opportunities emerge while the firm is still
experimenting:
v Two initial applications for Nutrasweet — arti-
ficially sweetening breakfast cereals and replacing
saccharin — fizzled while an unanticipated market
sizzled. Nutrasweetened breakfast cereal ran into
technical and regulatory obstacles and saccharin
users rejected Nutrasweet because it did not have
the aftertaste of saccharin! Instead Nutrasweet
found a market with dissatisfied sugar users
(Lynn et al., 1996).
Finally, established firms often perceived that they
have too much invested in the status quo to risk
destroying the existing industry and market. The
greater the threat of cannabalization, the more
intense is the resistance to market driving ideas:
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v IBM remained focused too long on mainframes at
the expense of personal computers because PCs
required a different distribution system, had lower
margins, and was not as after-sales service inten-
sive as the mainframe business.
v General Motors and Ford were slow in responding
to the popularity of minivans because it put their
conventional station wagons at risk.
v For fear of cannibalizing their permanent soft lens
and solution businesses, Bausch and Lomb
ignored disposable soft lenses, which are more
comfortable and provide better vision for the con-
sumer.
From Market Driven to Market Driving
Although new entrepreneurial firms can single-
mindedly pursue a make or break market driving
perspective, most established firms have too many
obligations and too much to lose to justify the obvi-
ous risks of chasing only radical market driving ‘big
hits.’11 In such firms, the search for radical business
innovation should not be pursued to the detriment
of improving the existing busi-
ness. Incumbent firms should
devote the overwhelming
majority of their innovation
efforts to market driven activi-
ties, such as incremental inno-
vation and traditional market
research. Nevertheless, some
room must be found for radical
business innovation or the mar-
ket leader risks being leap-frogged and deposed by
upstart market drivers. Projects need to be chosen in
the context of other projects in the company’s port-
folio so that there is an adequate balance between
incremental and radical innovation. Thus, as Tush-
man and O’Reilly observe, firms need to be ambidex-
trous, capable of simultaneously managing incremen-
tal as well as radical innovation (Tushman and
O’Reilly, 1996).
Unfortunately, established firms find it difficult to
generate and launch radical market driving inno-
vations. An established firm that wishes to engage in
market driving must meet two challenges — it must
have the vision and environment to generate break-
through ideas and it must have the capital, fortitude,
and risk tolerance to persevere and allow the radical
idea to have a fair chance to succeed. The first is the
upstream creative challenge of developing the ability to
‘see differently.’ Since radical concepts often spring
from the imagination of a single individual, the firm
must create an environment where creativity in indi-
viduals may flourish. The second is the downstream
implementation challenge of successfully marketing the
unique concept, which requires a team effort. With-
out the ability to see differently, the firm is unable to
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change the rules of the game and must battle to
brand-switch buyers of competitors’ products in
existing markets. And, without the ability to
implement a market driving concept, the firm will
join the ranks of companies that failed to capitalize
on their inventions such as Xerox with personal com-
puters and EMI with scanner technology.
Unlike incremental innovation, where a well-
developed innovation process clearly is an asset, the
development of market driving ideas is more project
based. It is also difficult to predict who in the organi-
zation will develop a market driving idea and when
they will do so. Perhaps what Somerset Maugham
observed about writing novels applies here: ‘There
are three rules for writing a novel. Unfortunately no
one knows what they are.’ While we recommend
some practices that will help established firms
increase their probability of developing market driv-
ing innovations, even if all of these practices are
employed, they will not guarantee that a market
driving innovation will be discovered. Some market
driving firms do not engage in all of these practices.
Nevertheless, if these practices are instituted, the firm
will be better positioned to discover and implement
market driving innovations independent of the
people running the company. What we find of parti-
cular concern, however, is that many of today’s man-
agement trends are unfortunately moving in direc-
tions that make it less likely market driving ideas will
arise and thrive.
Allow Space for Serendipity
Serendipity has played a role in the development of
many radical new ideas. To allow for serendipity, 3M
researchers are encouraged to spend up to 15 per cent
of their time on a research project of their choice. This
ensures that problem driven research does not pre-
clude all curiosity driven research. 3M’s famous Post-
It notes were invented when an associate was
attempting to develop a better bookmark for his
hymn book. Similarly, one of Searle’s research scien-
tists discovered the artificial sweetener Nutrasweet
while looking for a possible treatment for ulcers. As
Schumpeter observed: ‘History is a record of
“effects,” the vast majority of which nobody intended
to create.’ Unfortunately, re-engineering efforts in
most firms have eliminated much of the slack within
which serendipity thrives.
Select and Match Employees for Creativity
To generate new ideas, Nissan Design International
deliberately promotes ‘creative abrasion’ by hiring
people in contrasting pairs (e.g. balancing nerds with
hippies). Employees are encouraged to display color
charts of their ‘personalysis’ to help managers do the
mixing. For implementation of creative ideas, Henry
Ford looked towards inexperienced employees: ‘It is
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not easy to get away from tradition. That is why all
our new operations are always directed by men who
have no previous knowledge of the subject and there-
fore have not had the chance to get on really familiar
terms with the impossible’ (Ford, 1988). In many
market leaders, however, rounds of testing and inter-
views do more to reinforce conformity than to
assemble a collection of individuals with diverse
capabilities and perspectives.
Empower Latent Entrepreneurs and Offer
Multiple Channels for New Idea Approval
Even firms with a history of prior market driving
activity find it difficult to keep the fires of iconoclastic
creativity stoked. Today’s successful market driver
must beware ossifying into the cautious, market
driven behemoth of tomorrow. In any large firm can
be found many frustrated potential entrepreneurs
who have ideas as yet unveiled. In most organiza-
tions, approval of a new business idea requires sev-
eral ‘yes’ votes as it moves up the hierarchy while a
single ‘no’ can kill it; the nature of radical market
driving innovation is such that it is almost certain
to gather a ‘no’ somewhere in the process. To help
promising new ideas surface, an idea generator at 3M
has numerous channels that can be used for securing
approval and support for a project if one’s immediate
superior rejects it. Providing alternative routes for
approval changes this dynamic to one where a pro-
ject garnering a single ‘yes’ vote in the face of several
‘no’ votes still proceeds.
Japanese firms like NEC have launched competitions
to find maverick ideas, harness individual initiative,
and develop entrepreneurs among its employees (see
Example 1). Similarly, Toyota’s Dream 1995 cam-
paign encouraged ‘entrepreneurs with new business
ideas to serve as presidents of new businesses’ to
submit proposals to their Business Development
Department. Toyota realized that the traditional
strength of guaranteed lifetime employment recipro-
cated by deep commitment on the part of employees
had unintentionally created a passive culture ‘which
reacts to events rather than drives change’ (emphasis
in original).12 The poster of the program screamed,
‘The president’s chair is waiting for you.’
Establish Competitive Teams and ‘Skunk Works’
In the early stages of the development of a radical
new concept, it is not readily apparent which tech-
nology or format will succeed and which market will
materialize. Therefore, Motorola encourages its wire-
less divisions to compete against each other on the
assumption that the marketplace will select the win-
ner. IBM had about half a dozen parallel develop-
ment teams for the PC. Often when selecting a parti-
cular new technology as its main focus, Sharp
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maintains small R&D projects on the alternative tech-
nologies.
In an established firm, a radical new concept will
typically either fall outside the current business
definition or target markets of the firm (e.g. Nutra-
sweet for Searle) or pose a serious threat to destroy
much of the firm’s existing business (e.g. IBM’s per-
sonal computer launch). In addition, market driving
projects, by definition, require a unique business sys-
tem, which means limited synergy with the firm’s
existing business system. When market driving ideas
are pursued within the existing business structure,
other priorities often hinder their successful, speedy
fruition.
To help overcome organizational resistance and iner-
tia, firms can set up ‘skunk works,’ physically and
organizationally independent, self contained entities
with dedicated members.13 Skunk works bring a
sense of urgency to the project, harness the entrepr-
eneurial zeal of members, and concentrate the effort
of those involved; importantly, they also protect the
fledgling business from entrenched interests who
have motives to kill the project. 3M, IBM, Apple, Ray-
chem, DuPont, Ericsson, General Electric, Xerox, and
AT&T, all use skunk works to capture the soul of a
small, entrepreneurial outfit within the body of their
large firms. Although some companies have recently
become disillusioned with skunk works, we believe
in many cases this results from using skunk works
inappropriately, specifically, for incremental inno-
vation and related businesses. Skunk works are most
effective when used to develop and unleash market
driving ideas.
Cannibalize Your Own
The natural tendency of established market leaders
to protect their core business makes it difficult for
them to voluntarily pursue avenues that threaten to
undermine that core. For example, Kodak’s desire to
ensure that its new digital business does not encroach
on its traditional film business has slowed their pro-
gress in digitial imaging. Pablo Picasso once
observed, ‘Every act of creation is first of all an act
of destruction.’ Market driving explicitly encourages
cannibalization, based in the belief that some firm
will cannibalize that core business, so we had better
do it ourselves. When Sony introduces a major new
product, three teams are created — the first team tin-
kers with minor improvements, the second seeks
major improvements, while the third explores ways
to make that new product obsolete. At Hewlett-Pack-
ard, which fosters competition among its divisions,
products less than two years old account for 60 per
cent of orders. Market driving retailers such Star-
bucks and Sam’s Clubs of the United States, Swed-
en’s Hennes and Mauritz, and Italy’s Benneton stra-
tegically cannibalize their own stores to some extent
by building new outlets close to existing, successful
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locations, thereby leaving few vacant spaces for com-
petitors to exploit. They believe in keeping the canni-
bals in the family.
Encourage Experimentation and Tolerate Mistakes
Developing an experimenting organization that seeks
creative solutions requires a tolerance for mistakes.
Firms must probe and learn in the marketplace,
improving with each successive generation. The first
Wal-Mart store was horrible but Sam Walton
improved the format over time by trying different
ideas and watching customer reaction. Similarly, the
original Nike shoe wasn’t very good but they kept
learning and improving the technology. Luciano
Benetton, the founder of Benetton, observed that the
best market research is to open a new store and learn.
As Ingvar Kamprad of IKEA observed, ‘Only while
sleeping one makes no mistakes. The fear of making
mistakes is the root of bureaucracy and the enemy of
all evolution.’14
In the United States, the focus on daily stock price,
quarterly results, and Wall Street analysts tends to
severely punish missteps. This is another hurdle that
large, publicly traded market leaders must manage
in order to effectively cultivate market driving
activity. The company needs to carve out a sheltered
area where the risk-taking associated with experi-
menting can be tolerated and where there is room
for the inevitable failures that will sometimes ensue.
These potential failures are the price the firm must
pay to cultivate market driving, but they need to be
planned for so as not to cause unexpected shocks.
However, there must be some rules with respect to
failures. David Pottruck, CEO and President of
Charles Schwab, articulated the following three rules:
(1) Don’t put the company at risk. By limiting the
enormity of possible failure, one ensures that
employees bet the horse, not the farm. (2) Take
reasonable precautions against failure. (3) Learn
something from it (Pottruck, 1997).
Conclusion
Over time, even successful market driving firms
change, as they should, into market driven firms. The
history of innovation is a pattern in which bursts of
breakthrough innovation which reshape an industry
are interspersed by flows of less dramatic incremen-
tal improvements and refinements. Once the radical
innovation phase is over, incremental innovation to
improve the existing offering and business system
becomes the primary, immediate challenge. Further-
more, competitors ultimately emerge with competi-
tive, or even superior, value propositions and busi-
ness systems modeled after the ‘new’ market leader.
It is at this stage that market driving firms, like Tetra
Pak today, must search for their next market driving
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innovation. However, as the successful market driver
transforms into an established market leader, it faces
all the same obstacles to motivating market driving
strategies that the former market leaders faced. With
age and size, firms tend to become increasingly
bureaucratized, routinized, and risk averse. To date,
very few firms have been able to consistently launch
a series of successful market driving ideas. Sony has
been one such exception. We therefore end with an
example (Example 2) from Sony and their develop-
ment of computer diskettes which demonstrates how
they utilize almost every practice recommended
above to create a market driving culture.
Example 1: Discovering, Cultivating,
and Empowering Latent Entrepreneurs
at NEC
In 1992, to give new business ideas space to develop
outside the corporate bureaucracy, NEC invited its
employees to submit proposals for their own start-
up companies. Entitled ‘Venture Promotion and
Entrepreneur Search Program’ it generated 146 ideas.
One selected proposal was submitted by Mr Shirota,
a 56 year old career NEC employee. His business idea
was to develop and market a software program
which would provide a high-tech design tool for
Japan’s kimono makers. By scanning the customer’s
photograph into a computer and then graphically
superimposing kimonos, the customers can ‘try on’
different kimonos without actually changing outfits.
The company, Kainoatec, was launched in 1995 with
NEC providing 54 per cent of the 13 million yen start-
up capital and with Mr Shirota and a colleague, Mr
Koterazawa, each chipping in 3 million yen. Since its
launch, Kainoatec has developed similar software for
the eyeglass industry so that customers can try on
spectacles without having to remove their own eye-
glasses. The venture generated profits of nearly 5
million yen in its first year and has increased sales
and profits every year since then.
Authentic Limited is another company launched as
a result of the proposals generated in 1992. It makes
top-of-the line stereo speakers from granite. This
company has since developed the tiniest speaker in
the world for personal computers as well as a flat
speaker in collaboration with New Transducers Ltd,
a UK based company. The flat speakers have been
incorporated in a new NEC notebook computer
launched in August 1997. The ultra thin panel speak-
ers slide out from behind the LCD display and pro-
vide superior sound for multimedia applications on
the go. This venture was the idea of 46 year old Mr
Kondo, who had worked for an NEC subsidiary for
15 years. He contributed 30 per cent of the capital
while NEC contributed the rest. Authentic currently
employs 36 people and 1997 sales are anticipated to
be in excess of 5 billion yen.
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The in-house entrepreneur program has become an
annual event at NEC. More than 600 new business
ideas have been generated. To maximize the number
of proposals, the annual invitation is widely pub-
licized to all employees of NEC and its subsidiaries.
Furthermore, initial proposals are limited to
presenting only an overview of the new business con-
cept. Later, as proposals move through various selec-
tion steps, projected sales, profits, and investment
information are gathered through detailed business
plans. As Mr Shirota, now President of Kainoatec,
observes, the program helps discover hidden
entrepreneurs among the Japanese salarymen who
are waiting for someone to tap them on the shoulder
and give them a chance.
Example 2: The Market Driving Culture
at Sony
Sony has been a powerhouse in developing and
launching innovative products which have created
new markets and businesses, such as the transistor
radio, Walkman, 3.5 inch diskette, and audio com-
pact attest. ‘New products create new markets’ is a
guiding credo at Sony. Sony claims that their strong-
est assets are employees who combine dreams of cre-
ating new products or markets, with the passion and
enthusiasm to execute them.
Sony practices several principles that large, estab-
lished companies should adopt to become more mar-
ket driving. Sony leaves room for experimentation,
tolerates mistakes, cannibalizes its own, encourages
competitive teams, and offers multiple channels for
approval of new ideas. They also nurture and reward
individual creativity as illustrated by the following
story.
In 1980, three teams in two departments were work-
ing in parallel to develop a 10 3 improvement to the
conventional 5.25 inch ‘floppy’ diskette. Initially,
each team was essentially a single individual with a
distinct vision of the product concept. The first indi-
vidual envisioned it as a more compact floppy, the
second individual visualized it as a 3.5 inch plastic
encased disk, and the third individual, who was in a
different department, was working on a 2 inch dis-
kette with high rotation speed. At this stage, it was
unclear whether any of these would deliver a pro-
duct that could be marketed successfully.
After three months, the first team had encountered
several technical problems while the second team, led
by 28 year old Mr Kamoto, had developed a promis-
ing prototype (an early version of the 3.5 inch plastic-
encased diskette that is the world standard today).
Since they belonged to the same department, the first
team was disbanded with the former members
redirected to other projects, including a few who
FROM MARKET DRIVEN TO MARKET DRIVING
were assigned to the second team. The former leader
of the first team was asked by the head of the depart-
ment to author and present a paper on the 3.5 inch
diskette at an upcoming Japanese technical confer-
ence. It was explained to Mr Kamoto that while all
the internal recognition at Sony for the invention of
the 3.5 inch diskette would go to Mr Kamoto, it was
important to keep the former leader of the first
team motivated.
The 3.5 inch diskette, unveiled at the Chicago indus-
try show in 1981, piqued Apple’s interest. In 1983,
Steve Jobs, the founder of Apple Computer, adopted
the new diskette for the Macintosh, demanding
assurances that the product would be substantially
improved within one year. The enhanced system
would be double-sided rather than single-sided,
incorporate an automatic inject and eject system, and
still reduce by 50 per cent power consumption,
height of the disk drive, and price. Despite these
improvements, the product was still ignored by most
of the larger IBM compatible world, adopted by only
two major customers, Apple and Hewlett-Packard. In
1987, Mr Kamoto was transferred to sales and mar-
keting despite having no experience in these func-
tions. It was thought that only he, having invented
the 3.5 inch diskette, had the passion to make it a
worldwide standard. Today, it has replaced the
5.25 inch floppy diskette as the standard format for
storing data by personal computer users.
In 1991, Sony put Mr Kamoto in charge of improving
its languishing personal computer internal hard
drive business, hoping that he would do for hard
drives what he had done for the 3.5 inch diskette.
Unfortunately, despite his best efforts the venture
was an expensive failure and Mr Kamoto was asked
to close down the operations. Given this highly vis-
ible failure, Mr Kamoto thought his career at Sony
was effectively over. Sony, however, recognized that
he was motivated by his enthusiasm to contribute to
the company and accepted the failure as a learning
experience. Following the hard drive fiasco, Sony
gave Mr Kamoto the responsibility for managing
another data storage device, the magnetic tape drive.
Under his charge, Sony’s worldwide market share for
magnetic tape drives increased from 3 to 25 per cent
over three years.
While Mr Kamoto and the 3.5 inch diskette were
moving from strength to strength, the leader of the
third team, Mr Kutaragi, was struggling. His design
for the 2 inch diskette was completed in 1982, the
year after the 3.5 inch diskette. Mr Kutaragi’s diskette
delivered excellent performance, but its architecture
required significant changes in the associated hard-
ware. As a result, no company other than Sony
adopted it. Unfortunately, Sony’s laptop, ‘Produce’
launched in 1983–84, did not succeed and Mr Kutar-
agi had to search for other applications for the
2 inch diskette.
The diskette found its next home in Sony’s new still
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camera called ‘Mavica’ which, despite high expec-
tations, failed. Mr Kutaragi, doggedly persisting in
the face of continuing failure, then approached Nin-
tendo in the hope of persuading them to use the
2 inch diskette with their video game software. When
Nintendo signed a contract with Sony for the 2 inch
diskette, Mr Kutaragi thought he had finally found
the killer application for his invention. Three years
later, Nintendo canceled the contract without ever
using the product.
A disappointed Mr Kutaragi approached Sony’s lead-
ership with a proposal to develop their own line of
video games using CD-ROMs. Mr Kutaragi con-
vinced Sony that his three years of discussion with
Nintendo had given him a deep understanding of the
video game business and insights into Nintendo’s
strengths and weaknesses. With assistance from
Sony’s business strategy group, PlayStation video
games were developed and launched in 1994 as a
competitor to Nintendo. Since its launch, more than
50 million PlayStations have been sold and Sony
presently controls 60 per cent of the 15 billion dollar
video-game market.
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Notes
1. An excellent source for more details on this example is V.
Kasturi Rangan, The Aravind Eye Hospital, Madurai,
India: in service for sight [Harvard Business School case
9-593-098].
2. Several authors make the point that market research is
less useful in generating radical innovation (e.g. Lynn et
al., 1996). In their study of ‘breakthroughs’ Nayak and
Ketteringham noted that in every case it was the curiosity
of the inventor rather than market pull or financial need
that was the motivating force behind the breakthrough.
However, it must be noted that while our focus is on rad-
ical innovation, every firm must also engage simul-
taneously in incremental innovation. In fact, incremental
innovation for most companies should encompass the
vast majority of their innovation efforts. Despite its limi-
tations with respect to radical innovation, market research
is invaluable for helping firms with incremental inno-
vation (see Lynn et al., 1996; Nayak and Ketteringham,
1993).
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. [Harvard Business School case 9-
794-024].
4. Our view of innovation has a considerable lineage in the
strategy literature. We adopt Tushman and Anderson’s
distinction between incremental and radical innovation,
also referred to as continuous versus discontinuous or
evolutionary versus revolutionary innovation. Sub-
sequently this distinction has been applied to new pro-
duct development (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Leon-
ard-Barton, 1992). Because market driving is more than
just developing a new product, we apply the incremental
versus radical distinction to business innovation. Business
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innovation is similar to Markides’ notion of strategic inno-
vation which he defines as changing the rules of the game
without the help of technological innovation. Market driv-
ing is both similar and different from strategic innovation.
It is similar in that we are also examining changing the
rules of the game without technological innovation but,
as we understand it, for Markides this change in the rules
of the game could be the result of either radical or
incremental innovation with respect to value proposition
and/or business system. In contrast, we prefer to dis-
tinguish innovation on two dimensions — value prop-
osition (what is offered to the customer) and business sys-
tem (how the company creates and delivers its value
proposition) — and restrict market driving to firms that
engage in radical innovation on both dimensions. Inno-
vation in the value proposition has previously been men-
tioned by Kim and Maugborne, without however the
emphasis on incremental versus radical, and we borrow
their term value innovation. Our conceptualization of the
business system is similar to Porter’s value chain concept
and we borrow the term architectural innovation from
Henderson and Clark (see Tushman and Anderson, 1986;
Christensen and Bower, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Mar-
kides, 1997; Kim and Mauborgne, 1997; Porter, 1985;
Henderson and Clark, 1990).
5. The authors are deeply indebted to Professor Xavier Gil-
bert for sharing his presentation ‘Achieving Exceptional
Competitiveness’ [1997]. We adapt his conceptualization
of the IKEA business system.
6. See Kotler (1997) for a discussion on the differences
between sales driven and market driven companies. Cus-
tomer driven and market driving are our own concep-
tualizations.
7. See Nayak and Ketteringham (1993) for the Federal
Express story.
8. Southwest Airlines: 1993 (A) [Harvard Business School
case 9-694-023].
9. Tripsas’ study of radical technological innovation indi-
cated that new entrants succeed over incumbents in those
situations where the innovation devalues the existing
complementary specialized investments of incumbents.
Since in our conceptualization, market driving firms are
those that develop a unique business system, it follows
that the existing business system of incumbents is deva-
lued and therefore market driving firms tend to be new
entrants (see Tripsas, 1997).
10. Professor Jay Galbraith observed this during a lecture
attended by the first author.
11. There may be however some critical junctures when a
large successful company has to bet on a future and rein-
vent itself. Hewlett-Packard, Intel, and Nokia are fre-
quently cited as examples of this.
12. Internal Toyota documents.
13. There is considerable literature on skunk works. Some
useful articles for practitioners are Gwynne (1997); Single
and Spurgeon (1996).
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14. Ingvar Kamprad and IKEA [Harvard Business School case
9-390-132].
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